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Non-technical Summary 
 
A major incentive for human capital investments is the possibility to signal individual 
productivity gained by training not only to the present employer but also to the external 
labour market. There are only few empirical assessments of the capacity to signal the value 
of professional or occupational training, however. The most important reason for this gap in 
the literature is that training quality and employee productivity are not easy to measure. 
More specifically, prior tenure, unobservable ability and the business cycle usually have an 
unobservable effect on the market value of job applicants after training. 
This paper for the first time presents evidence for negative selection and signals for 
employer changers. It uses the German dual apprenticeship system as an institution that 
allows us to analyse the value of signals after occupational training. Apprentices do not have 
prior employment experience and they are relatively homogeneous with respect to their age 
and schooling background given their occupation. In addition, they attend a highly 
standardised programme with three certificates at the end that help them to signal practical, 
theoretical and social skills. Finally,most apprentices start and finish their training 
programme at the same point in time and therefore cyclical labour demand and supply 
effects are the samewhen apprentices select themselves into a training programme and 
when they hit the labour market. 
We distinguish signals from three sources: occupation, training employer and individual. 
There are quality differences between occupations and therefore we only compare 
apprentices with the same occupation and remove apprentices who work in a different 
occupation after they finish their apprenticeship from the data set. Employer changers 
nevertheless signal a different relative productivity when the occupational retention rate 
differs. A lower average productivity of employer changers can be assumed if employer 
changers are a negatively selected group because training employers know the quality of 
their apprentices and succeed in retaining their most able apprentices. This paper indeed 
shows that the higher the occupational retention rate the more negative the selection and 
therefore the higher the wage loss of employer changers. The same effect on entry wages 
for job changers is found for another group signal, the retention rate of the training 
employer – employer changers from a training firm that retains most of their employees 
experience a higher wage loss. In addition, the size of the training employer, a high average 
  
apprentice wage, and works councils are used as signals for training quality and induce a 
wage bonus for employer changers. Also according to the signalling theory, employer 
changers with higher schooling levels obtain a higher entry wage as skilled employees. This 
paper finally develops a measure for relative productivity of apprentices, their relative wage 
position. We argue that a wage bonus is paid voluntarily by the training firm in order to 
retain and motivate the most able apprentices. We indeed find that a high wage position 
leads to a higher chance to stay with the training firm. This again is an argument for negative 
selection of employer changers. In addition, a high wage position also leads to an increase in 
entry wages of employer changers in the new firm – obviously the (unobservable) wage 
position is positively correlated with other observable signals such as certificates. 
  
  
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung 
 
Ein wichtiger Anreizmechanismus für Humankapitalinvestitionen ist die Möglichkeit, die 
dabei erworbene Produktivitätserhöhung nicht nur bei dem eigenen Arbeitgeber sondern 
auch im externen Arbeitsmarkt zu signalisieren. Bisher gibt es allerdings nur wenige 
empirische Untersuchungen zur Wirkung von Signalen beruflicher Bildung sowie 
Weiterbildung. Der bedeutendste Grund für diese offensichtliche Literaturlücke ist, dass die 
Qualität der Humankapitalbildung sowie die individuelle Produktivität nicht leicht messbar 
sind. Konkret haben vorherige Betriebszugehörigkeit, unbeobachtete Fähigkeiten und der 
Wirtschaftszyklus üblicherweise einen unbeobachtbaren Effekt auf den Marktwert von 
Stellenbewerbern nach deren Humankapitalerwerb.  
In diesem Beitrag werden zum ersten Mal gezeigt, dass ausbildende Betriebe die besten 
Auszubildenden an sich binden und somit Betriebswechsler nach der dualen Ausbildung eine 
geringere durchschnittliche Produktivität aufweisen. Betriebswechsler können individuelle 
ihre Produktivität aber mit Hilfe von Signalen vermitteln und damit ihren Einstiegslohn 
positiv beeinflussen. Das deutsche duale Berufsbildungssystem erlaubt es als Institution, den 
Wert von Signalen nach der Ausbildung zu messen. Lehrlinge haben keine vorherige 
Berufserfahrung und sie sind relativ homogen in Bezug auf ihren Schulhintergrund. Überdies 
besuchen sie ein standardisiertes Ausbildungsprogramm, das mit drei Zertifikaten 
abgeschlossen wird, die ihnen helfen, praktische, theoretische und soziale Fähigkeiten zu 
signalisieren. Außerdem beginnen und beenden die meisten Auszubildenden ihre Ausbildung 
im gleichen Zeitraum und somit sind zyklische Arbeitsnachfrage und –angebotseffekte zum 
Zeitpunkt der Wahl des Ausbildungsberufs und bei der Beendigung der Ausbildung gleich. 
Wir können Signale aus drei Quellen unterscheiden: Beruf, ausbildendes Unternehmen und 
Individuum. Es gibt Qualitätsunterschiede zwischen Berufen und deshalb vergleichen wir nur 
Lehrlinge mit dem gleichen Beruf, die in diesem auch nach der Ausbildung arbeiten. 
Arbeitgeberwechsler nach der Ausbildung haben ein mehr oder weniger negatives 
Gruppensignal je nach der Übernahmequote in ihrem Beruf. Wir gehen davon aus, dass 
Betriebswechsler weniger produktiv sind, weil die ausbildenden Unternehmen ihre 
Auszubildenden kennen und die Besten halten können. Deshalb ist das Signal des 
Betriebswechsels umso negativer im Vergleich zu denjenigen, die im ausbildenden 
Unternehmen bleiben, je höher die berufliche Übernahmequote ist. Es kann in der Tat 
  
gezeigt werden, dass die berufliche Übernahmequote einen negativen Effekt auf den 
Einstiegslohn von Betriebswechslern hat. Der gleiche Effekt kann für die betriebliche 
Übernahmequote des Ausbildungsunternehmens nachgewiesen werden. Darüber hinaus 
gibt die Größe des Ausbildungsunternehmens, dessen Lohnniveau für Auszubildende 
undBetriebsräte in diesen Betrieben ein positives Signal für die Ausbildungsqualität und 
induziert somit einen Lohnaufschlag für Betriebswechsler. Gemäß der Signaltheorie erzielen 
Betriebswechsler mit einer höheren Schulbildung einen höheren Einstiegslohn.  
In diesem Papier wird zudem ein Maß für die relative Produktivität von Auszubildenden 
entwickelt: ihre relative Lohnposition am Ende der Ausbildung innerhalb eines Betriebs, 
Jahrs und Berufs. Wir argumentieren, dass der Lohnaufschlag freiwillig vom ausbildenden 
Unternehmen bezahlt wird, um die besten Auszubildenden an den Betrieb zu binden und zu 
motivieren. In der Tat finden wir, dass die Auszubildenden miteiner hohen Lohnposition, 
eine höhere Chance haben, übernommen zu werden. Dies ist wiederum eine wichtige 
Evidenz für die negative Selektion der Betriebswechsler. Hinzu kommt, dass eine hohe 
Lohnposition während der Ausbildung zu einem Lohnaufschlag der Betriebswechsler führt – 
offensichtlich ist die (für den aufnehmenden Betrieb unbeobachtbare) Lohnposition positiv 
mit anderen beobachtbaren Signalen wie den Zeugnissen des Bewerbers korreliert. 
  
 
How Acid are Lemons? 
Adverse Selection and Signalling for Skilled Labour Market Entrants 
 
Robert Wagner, Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich 
Thomas Zwick, Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich  
and Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim♣ 
February 2012 
 
Key-Words: entry wages, employer change, adverse selection, signalling 
JEL-Codes: J24, J31, J62, J63, M52, M53 
Abstract 
This paper jointly analyses the consequences of adverse selection and signalling on entry 
wages of skilled employees. It uses German linked employer employee panel data (LIAB) and 
introduces a measure for relative productivity of skilled job applicants based on 
apprenticeship wages. It shows that post-apprenticeship employer changers are a negative 
selection from the training firms’ point of view. Negative selection leads to lower average 
wages of employer changersin the first skilled job in comparison to stayers. Entry wages of 
employer changers are specifically reduced by high occupation and training firm retention 
rates. Additional training firm signals are high apprenticeship wages that signal a positive 
selection of apprenticeship applicants, works councils and establishment size. Finally, 
positive individual signals such as schooling background affect the skilled entry wages of 
employer changers positively. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the seminal work by Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973), the effects of adverse selection 
and signalling on the labour market have been at the centre of fruitful research. Although 
there is a large theoretical literature on how firms tackle adverse selection and signals from 
job applicants, surprisingly little is known about the empirical effects and importance of 
adverse selection and signals (Behrenz, 2001; Hu and Taber, 2011). The first reason for this 
gap in the literature is that individual ability and productivity are not easy to measure and 
therefore the selectivity of employer changers can be only rarely captured empirically 
(Schönberg, 2007). The second reason is that for the assessment of the role of signals, the 
labour market history of employer changers has to be known including the characteristics of 
previous employers. This information again is notavailablein most data sets and usually the 
researcher has less information than the new employer for the determination of entry 
wages of employer changers (Gibbons and Katz, 1991, p. 377/378). In this paper, we provide 
a measure for relative ability and show that employer changers indeed are a negatively 
selected group. Then we use qualification, previous employer and individual signals in order 
assess their relative importance for entry wages of employer changers. We concentrate on 
skilled employees in their first skilled job immediately after graduation from their 
apprenticeship qualification. This concentration on a homogeneous group has the advantage 
that productivity differences between employer changers that usually cannot be controlled 
for such as for example previous tenure, experience, cyclical labour market effects and 
training content do not differ or can be taken into account.  
The German apprenticeship system is the main entry route for school leavers into the 
labour market (Ryan, 2001). It is the backbone of the German skilled labour market – more 
than half of the workingage population obtainedits highest professional degree from the 
apprenticeship systemand an additional ten percent has a double degree from the 
apprenticeship system and an academic study or a professional masterdegree (BMBF, 2010). 
According to Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), training firms use the apprenticeship period for 
screening and try to retain the most capable apprentices. This implies that employer 
changers are a negatively selected group whose average productivity level is lower than that 
of those who stay at the employer providing their apprenticeship training. Therefore, firms 
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hiring from the negatively selected group of employer changers after apprenticeship 
graduation might compensate the higher risk of drawing a “lemon” by offering lower wages 
(Akerlof, 1970; Greenwald, 1986). Signals of employer changers that credibly indicate high 
productivity are one possibility to reduce the group adverse selection problem and 
individually increase entry wages (Spence, 1973). So far, there is very little evidence whether 
employer changers indeed are a negatively selected group and whether hiring firms perceive 
and react to group and individual signals. 
This is therefore the first paper that provides evidence on adverse selection and 
signals of employer changers for a large and important group of employees. We use the 
willingness to pay a bonus for apprentices at the end of apprenticeship training as a measure 
for their productivity in comparison to their peer group in the same occupation and at the 
same employer. Furthermore, we analyse the effect of (occupation and training firm) and 
individual signals generated during apprenticeship training on post-apprenticeship wages of 
recently graduated employer changers. We use linked employer-employee panel data to 
separate the measurement of individual traits, occupational and training firm factors. We 
look at a homogeneous sample of apprenticeship graduates who immediately come from 
school and immediately start to work after graduation in a skilled position in their 
occupation. This strategy allows us to draw causal inferences about the importance of 
individual, previous employer and occupationsignalsfor job applicants in a negatively 
selected group. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
on adverse selection as well as signalling and connects the findings with the German 
apprenticeship system. Section 3 presents an analytical framework on signals of employer 
switchersafter apprenticeship training. Section 4 explains our estimation strategy. The next 
section describes the data and analyses differences between movers and stayers after 
apprenticeship training. In Section 6, we present our findings. Section 7 discusses some 
robustness checks for the selectivity of the employer change decision. The paper ends with a 
conclusion in Section 8. 
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2 Adverse selection and signals in the German apprenticeship system 
Adverse selection 
An apprenticeship contract between an apprentice and an employer is set up for a fixed 
training period (§ 11 Vocational Training Act), ranging from two up to three and a half years 
depending on the occupation. The apprenticeship legally terminates at the day after the final 
exam and none of the parties has legal claims to extend the employment relationship (§21 
Vocational Training Act). This implies that training firms can get rid of their former 
apprentices at no costs. In addition, employer movers either receive no offer to remain in 
the training firm as skilled workers or they receive a take-over offer but wish to leave the 
training firm voluntarily. The wage disadvantage of employer changers induced by the 
adverse selection risk therefore only reduces the willingness to change employers of those 
who actually received an offer to stay with their training firm (Greenwald, 1986). More than 
30% of apprenticeship graduateswho remain in the labour market1 immediately separate 
from their training firm to work in other companies (BMBF, 2010). 
Acemoglu & Pischke (1998) argue that training firms use the training period for 
screening.These firms know by the end of apprenticeship training the productivity (ability) 
levels of their apprentices. As “the value of a worker to a firm is an increasing function of the 
information it has about the worker’s general training” (Katz & Ziderman, 1990, p. 1149), 
screening during training creates a substantial informational advantage for the training firm2. 
This informational advantage implies two interrelated consequences. First, if training firms 
can distinguish between more and less able apprentices,theymight try to retain only the 
most capable graduates (Greenwald, 1986; Mohrenweiser et al., 2010). Second, outside 
firms hiring from the pool of firm changers after apprenticeship, may face an adverse 
selection problem (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998). 
If training firms use their informational advantage and succeed in retaining 
mainlyhigh ability graduates, “the stream of job-changers should be composed 
disproportionately of less able workers” (Greenwald, 1986, p. 325). In this case, hiring firms 
                                                           
1
 More than 70% of all apprenticeship graduates remain in the labour market and work in a full or part-time 
position (Beicht & Ulrich, 2008). 
2
 Because of the high degree of standardisation in the apprenticeship system, information asymmetry between 
training and outside firms is mainly caused by unobservable individual characteristics of the apprenticeship 
graduate and the training firm instead of the training content (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998).  
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anticipate that training firms use their informational advantage and consider movers as 
having a high risk to be “lemons” (Akerlof, 1970). They compensate their risk of drawing a 
lemon by offering lower entry wages for employer changers. 
There is only very little evidence on the extent and the effects of adverse selection of 
employer changers when previous employers have superior knowledge on unobservable 
employee characteristics. One example comes from the New Orleans slave market in the 
19th century. The authors indirectly identify the degree of adverse selection by an 
examination of relative prices of slaves from different regions of origin. Their estimates 
indicate that slaves brought to market have been on average substantially less productive 
than the slave population in general (Greenwald and Glasspiegel, 1983). Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1993) compare the piece-rate (actual productivity) and time-rate wages 
(employers´ perceptions of productivity) of casual workers in the Philippines. They also find 
that there is adverse selection of employer changers. Schönberg (2007) finally demonstrates 
on the basis of test scores for the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) – which is a 
measure for basic literacy and numeric skills –that employer movers are a negative selection. 
The empirical literature onmover-stayer wage differentials of apprenticeship 
graduates in Germany is not conclusive. Earlier studies suggest higherpost-apprenticeship 
wages for movers. Harhoff & Kane (1997) explain the wage advantage of movers by 
assuming that only the most capable graduates in the industry change the employer. Euwals 
& Winkelmann (2004) find that the higher wages of movers are driven by those movers who 
change to a larger firm. These contributions do not take into account the potential 
endogeneity of the moving decision, however. They cannot distinguish between separations 
caused by quits implying an improved career or firm match (Jovanovic, 1979; Neal, 1999)and 
layoffs that usually lead to a wage penalty (McLaughlin, 1991).3 
The majority of studies examining the mover-stayer wage differential of 
apprenticeship graduates however findslowerentry wages for employer movers and explains 
the result by adverse selection (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998; Dustmann et al., 1997; Bougheas 
& Georgellis, 2004).The studies by von Wachter & Bender (2006) and Göggel & Zwick (2009) 
show that taking into account the endogeneity of the separation decision increases the 
                                                           
3
 In terms of the apprenticeship system, a quit equals a situation where an apprenticeship graduate receives a 
take-over offer of the training firm but leaves nevertheless. A layoff can be seen as a situation where the 
training firm does not offer to take over the apprenticeship graduate. 
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mover-stayer wage differential. They estimate a local average treatment effect for sub-
groupsof apprenticeship graduates who move because of (mainly) exogenous reasons.  
To sum up, the claim that employer changers at the end of apprenticeship are a 
negatively selected group is so far based on a comparison between the entry wages of 
employer stayers and movers and therefore rather indirect. This paper chooses a more 
direct approach. It measures the differences in productivity of apprenticeship graduates 
based on earnings bonuses training employers voluntarily pay to some of their apprentices. 
We can show on the basis of this relative productivity measure that employers indeed 
succeed in retaining their most able apprentices. In addition to the analysis of adverse 
selection of employer changers, we add evidence for the effectiveness of signals on entry 
wages. 
 
Signals 
The apprenticeship system and most of the training occupations have a long tradition in 
Germany. In addition, there are strict legal training regulations (Ausbildungsordnung) that 
are enforced by independent institutionssuch as the chambers of industry and commerce or 
the chambers of craft (Handwerkskammer, Industrie- und Handelskammer). Training 
regulations define the minimum requirements on vocational training in Germany. There is 
variation with regard to the execution of training contents in training firms4. State-
authorized institutions such as chambers guarantee transparent basic skills acquired in 
specific occupations. This means that most companies hiring from the pool of employer 
moverseither havetraining experience or they have at least realistic expectations about the 
average productivity levels obtained in different occupations.  
The analytical framework on signalling in the next part of this paper discriminates 
between occupation, training firm and individual signals. Besides the group identification 
signal average productivity of apprenticeship graduates from an occupation or a training 
firm, the German apprenticeship system also provides indicators for differences in individual 
performance– a crucial prerequisite for signals to reduce the adverse selection risk (Spence, 
1973). The main signalling source is credible certificates (Acemoglu & Pischke, 2000). These 
                                                           
4
Empirical evidence shows that there are differences in training investment within the dual system. 
Wenzelmann et al. (2009) show that the total costs for apprenticeship training significantly increase with firm 
size and are the highest in industry. Mohrenweiser & Zwick (2009) support this argument by showing that a 
higher share of apprentices relative to unskilled workers in manufacturing occupations has a negative effect on 
a company’s gross profit.  
6 
 
certificates serve as a valid signal for individual qualifications an apprenticeship graduate 
gained during training in addition to the group signals. The apprentice can present three 
certificates after graduation. These feature grades ranging from poor to excellent and have 
considerable variation (Wydra-Sommaggio et al. 2010). First, the reference from the 
employer during the apprenticeship training refers so social and work-related skills, second, 
the certificate from the chamber of industry and commerce or chamber of craftsrefers to the 
practical skills, and the certificate from the vocational college refers to the theoretical 
occupational skills. At least the certificates from the chambers and the professional schools 
are valid signals5 because the certification institutions are credible, state-authorized and 
neutral (Akerlof, 1970). These institutions have the legal mission to provide nationally 
comparable, transparent and independent assessments without own economic interests.  
It is striking that the previous empirical literature on signalsin the labour market 
mainly concentrates on school education level and tenure, experience or continuing training 
in the previous employment (Behrenz, 2001). In this paper, we pursue a completely different 
approach. We argue that we have a homogeneous sample with respect to cohort, previous 
tenure, experience and training as well as the timing of labour market entry. Apprenticeship 
graduates in one occupation who switch the employer all have the same tenure, experience 
and documented basic occupational training contents. They all start their career at the same 
point in time and they apply for a new job at the same point in time because their 
apprenticeship contract ends in the same week (the final examination day at the chamber of 
commerce or chamber of craft that is comparable for all regions in Germany). This means 
that we do not have to take into account secular trends and cyclical cohort effects at the 
start or the end of the previous employment when we control for the year of graduation. 
Many papers have shown that booms or recessions leave temporary and permanent scars 
for entry wage in first skilled jobs and have selection effects (Kahn, 2010). These cyclical 
effects in addition affect job applicants with different signals and schooling credentials 
differently (Oreopoulos et al., 2008). This might mean that the business cycle influences 
entry wages of apprenticeship graduates differently by occupation. In addition, all work 
related productivity differences between applicants have to come from human capital 
investments during the apprenticeship period because apprentices usually did not engage in 
                                                           
5
Seibert & Solga (2005) and Wydra-Somaggio et al. (2010) showthat apprenticeship certificates from the 
chambers are valid signals for the labour market. They find a positive correlation between the grades and entry 
wages of apprenticeship graduates 
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economic activities before. This means that mainly observable signals such as information on 
the occupation (occupational retention rate) and information on the training employer 
(apprentice retention rate, industrial relations, size, sector and apprentice wage level) as 
well as individual information (age, gender or school qualification6) drive entry wages of 
employer changers. 
Signals allow hiring firms to differentiate between high and low ability workers 
(Spence, 1973). The firms’ perception of the uncertainty in hiring a new worker and 
therefore the assessment of the risk involved is driven by “observable characteristics and 
attributes of the individual” (Spence, 1973, p. 357). This means that the hiring firm 
determines the wage of newly hired apprenticeship graduates based on a bundle of 
observable signals and indices7 for a given job. This paper shows that employer movers who 
are able to send credible positive signals can reduce the information asymmetry and partly 
offset the wage disadvantage from the group adverse selection risk. 
 
3 An analytical framework on signalling for employer movers after apprenticeship 
The following analytical framework explains the wage determination of hiring firms for 
apprenticeship graduates trained in other firms. It identifies individual signals that 
potentially reverse negative earnings effects from being part of an adversely selected group. 
The framework allows us to deduct hypotheses about potential signalsthat affect entry 
wages of apprenticeship graduates who switch their employer8. Let p be the probability of 
hiring a low ability worker and 1-p is the probability of hiring a high ability worker. The 
productivity per worker is y = αh, where α is average group productivity in an occupation and 
h the individual deviation of an apprenticeship graduate from α. The variable h = 1 stands for 
low ability workers and h > 1 for high ability workers. As we are interested in the wage 
determination of an apprenticeship graduate who immediately changes the employer, let α 
be the average productivity of an apprenticeship graduate in a given occupation. In a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium, hiring firms choose a wage levelthat leads to zero expected profits 
 : 
                                                           
6
 Unfortunately, we cannot include grades from the final school examinations. Therefore we have to assume 
that differences in the school levels are more important than differences in school grades. 
7
 Signals are defined as alterable characteristics of a person, such as education. Indices are fixed characteristics 
which cannot be altered by an individual such as age or sex (Spence, 1973).  
8
 The notation as well as the basic idea of our analytical framework is adopted from Acemoglu & Pischke (1998 
and 2000). 
8 
 
 
    	 
 1  	  	  0    (1) 
 
or 
 
   
 1  	.    (2) 
 
Equation 2 shows that the wage offer in a given occupation equals the expected productivity 
of the hired apprenticeship graduates based on the average occupational human capital, 
individual productivity and the adverse selection risk.  
Allowing for post-apprenticeship wage differentiation within a given occupation, 
thehiring firm needs additional information on occupational k and training firm n specific 
adverse selection risk in addition to the individualability level h for every hired worker i. 
Apprenticeship graduates therefore can send credible signals about p and h, and α is given 
by occupation. Assuming that hiring firms perceiveand react tothe signals discussed so far, 
we can add the following indices to equation 2: 
 
   
 1  	.   (3) 
 
In equation 3, wikn is the wage of person i in occupation k from company n. The variable αkis 
the expected productivity of every apprenticeship graduate in occupation k. The variableh is 
the ability of worker i and pkn is the group risk to be of low ability. The occupation and 
training firm group characteristics are independent and therefore low ability probability pkn 
can be thought of having the following functional form: 
 
    
 1  	.    (4) 
 
The weight of the information on pn is indicated by (1-v) and the weight for the information 
on pk by v. The differentiation between information about both group identification signals 
training occupation and training firmis important because we a-priori do not know whichpart 
of p can be observed (better) by the hiring firm. The better the hiring firm can observe one 
of the two components, the higher the weight of the components pk and pn in pkn. 
Equation 3 shows that wikn – ceteris paribus – increases with individual ability hi and 
decreases with the adverse selection risk pkn for a given occupation kand training firm n. The 
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prerequisite for hi and pkn to affect the wage wikn is that the hiring firm has credible 
information about themor in other words that movers generate credible signals on hi and 
pkn. Therefore, we propose the following three hypotheseson entry wages of employer 
changers after apprenticeship controlling for year and occupation: 
 
The entry wage of skilled employees who immediately move to another employer after their 
apprenticeship training 
H1: increases with positive individual signalshi. 
H2: decreases with the adverse selection risk induced from occupation information pk. 
H3: decreases with the adverse selection risk induced from training firm information pn. 
4 Indicators for adverse selection and signals 
In this paper, we argue that differences between wages for apprentices in their last 
apprenticeship year, controlling for employer, occupation and year, are indicators for 
productivity differences of apprentices and therefore can be used as a measure for adverse 
selection of employer changers. There are a couple of institutional reasons for this argument 
and we add some empirical evidence for our claim. The first institutional reason is that firms 
under collective bargaining agreements (almost 90% of the apprentices work for employers 
with collective bargaining or oriented at collective bargaining, Schönfeld et al., 2010) are 
forced to pay a fixed (minimum) wage for all employees irrespective of their occupation 
according to § 17 of the Vocational Training Act (BBiG). Apprentices´ wages are in addition 
controlled by the chambers of commerce or crafts. In practice, this collectively agreed 
apprenticeship wage constitutes a minimum wage, increases with every apprenticeship year 
and is well-known because as it is published by chambers of commerce and unions.  
In addition to this focal minimum wage, employers may grant selected (or all) 
apprentices a bonus (Ryan et al., 2010, Ryan, 2011). The voluntary bonuses frequently are 
based on good school grades or performance assessments and they can be interpreted as 
efficiency wages with the goal to reduce quits of highly productive apprentices the training 
enterprise would like to retain (Yellen, 1984). Quits of apprentices after graduation might be 
caused by apprentices´ disutility during apprenticeship (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998). 
Examples for disutility are apprentices not getting along with their colleagues or supervisor 
or wishing to move to a different city for family reasons. When the employer cannot observe 
10 
 
the individual disutility value (as argued by Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998), a bonus for the 
higher productive apprentices might be an attempt to reduce quits induced by disutility 
specifically for this group of apprentices. 
The absolute wage bonus training firms grant at the end of the apprenticeship 
training is low but the relative wage bonus may be a strong signal for higher wage increases 
and a good job prospect after the end of the apprenticeship period9 or may be perceived as 
a gift by the apprentice because they are well aware of the bonus (Akerlof, 1982). This 
means that in training firms where (some) apprentices receive bonus pay, high-ability 
apprentices should earn more than low-ability apprentices. The apprenticeship wage 
information obviously is unknown to the hiring firm after the apprenticeship is completed 
but it may be correlated with other individual signals such as examination grades in the 
occupational school or the chambers of commerce/crafts we cannot observe in this data set. 
The basic experimental idea to measure the effect of signals generated during 
apprenticeship training on post-apprenticeship wages of movers, is to estimate the average 
treatment effect of occupational,training firmand individual characteristics fixing other 
factors. Yet, it is not clear which signals are perceived as credible byhiring firms and 
therefore lead to higherindividual wages (Weiss, 1995). In this paper, we take indicators for 
occupational productivity levels αk, information about the adverse selection risk from the 
training occupation pk and the training employer pn, further information on training quality 
and apprentice selectivity in the training employer, and individual characteristics hi.The 
value of these signals is discussed now. 
Hiring firms have expectations about the average occupational productivity levels 
(Spence, 1973) because apprenticeship training curricula are highly standardised10 and most 
employers who hire skilled job entrants from other training firms train themselves. 
Occupations differ with regard to the required skill levels and the schooling background of 
the apprentices. Therefore, we regard occupational labour markets as separated, always 
include controls for occupations and only include skilled job entrants who do not change 
their 2-digit occupation immediately after the apprenticeship training.An occupational signal 
that might affect pk and therefore entry wages of employer changers is the occupational 
                                                           
9
 Mohrenweiser et al. (2010) show that there is a positive correlation between the relative wage position in the 
training firm at the end of the apprenticeship period and the entry wage in the first skilled employment. 
10
 Legal training regulations specify the training content and define occupational skill standards (§5 Vocational 
Training Act). 
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retention rate. According to the adverse selection theory, hiring firms might perceive high 
occupational retention rates as a signal for high adverse selection in this occupation. In 
addition, the experience with previous employer changers in occupations with high 
retention rates should be negative when indeed employer changers are a negatively selected 
group (Soskice, 1994). Therefore, high occupational retention rates should be negatively 
related with entry wages of employer changers. 
Hiring firms might also have information about the training firm of their job 
applicants. Training firms differ with respect to the quality of their apprenticeship training. 
To reach a higher skill level of apprentices than in comparable firms, a major part of the 
training has to be performed in expensive apprenticeship workshops, leading to higher 
training investments (Büchel & Neubäumer, 2001). Empirical evidence shows that there 
indeed are differences in training investments by training enterprises given an occupation 
(Mohrenweiser & Zwick, 2009). Therefore, training firms with a high training effort should 
provide higher skills than firms with low training efforts. The quality of apprentices from a 
training firm also is a typical experience good and many firms might induce the quality of 
apprentices from previously hired skilled employees from this training firm. Large training 
firms frequently have the means and scale advantages to provide high quality training. They 
also might have better opportunities to select the most able applicants because school 
graduates first apply in large and well-known training enterprises (Soskice, 1994). In 
addition, it is more probable that other firms know or have had (positive) experiences with 
apprenticeship graduates from large training firms. We therefore assume that the entry 
wage of an employer changer is positively correlated with the size of the training enterprise.  
Works councils and unions have a positive influence on training quality because they 
regard themselves as champions of the interests of apprentices (Kriechel et al., 2011). They 
ensure that the content and the process of training meets the formal training regulations 
and have the right to call for a replacement of training personnel who neglect their duties. 
Thus, training quality may be positively affected by works councils because it is more likely 
that negligence of such duties go undetected in firms without works councils. Dustmann & 
Schönberg (2009) find that collective bargaining coverage increases participation in training 
and we therefore might assume that also unions have a positive impact on apprenticeship 
quality. Kriechel et al. (2011) accordingly find higher net investments in apprenticeship 
training in enterprises with works councils and collective bargaining agreements. These – 
12 
 
usually easily observable – institutions of industrial relations in the training firm therefore 
also should send a positive signal for employer changers.  
We already argued that the retention rate of the training firm is additional 
information on the extent of possible adverse selection of apprentices coming from this firm. 
The retention rate should be negatively correlated with entry wages, accordingly. Finally, the 
wage bonus paid for apprentices on average (given their 2-digit occupation) is a signal of 
training quality and selectivity of the training firm for apprenticeship applicants. Higher 
training wages mean that the training firm voluntary pays more than the focal wage (usually 
the collectively bargained wage level). This attracts on average apprentices with higher 
ability, increases training investment costs and therefore should increase entry wages of 
employer changers from firms with high apprenticeship wages. 
Observable individual characteristics such as age, educational background, as well as 
the grades of the apprenticeship exam serve as signals for the hiring firm and drive entry 
wages of employer stayers and movers (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998; Göggel & Zwick, 2009; 
Wydra-Somaggio et al., 2010). Relatively old job applicants might signal problems in school 
because they had to repeat a class or needed additional schooling in an occupation school 
after general school (Übergangssystem) before they could start with their apprenticeship. 
We therefore would expect a negative correlation between the entry wage and the age of 
the employer changer. Graduates from all school types can apply for apprenticeships. In 
some occupation groups such as commerce and banking, mainly graduates from grammar 
school (Abitur) get an apprenticeship, in craft and construction occupations, most 
apprentices just have a lower secondary education. Therefore the positive signal of a 
grammar school has different weights in occupations. 
The institutional rules of the apprenticeship system in Germany described above and 
the transparent certification rules suggest that hiring firms might be able to assess the 
relative individual ability of applicants quit realistically. This does not mean, however that 
the different sources of information do not provide “signals” because the individual match of 
the employer changer and the new job is unknown and might differ between employers 
hiring two employer changers with the same observable characteristics. Whether hiring 
firms have to systematically correct the entry wages of their switching skilled job entrants in 
order to adapt them to their true productivity can only be detected by analysing the wage 
development in the first skilled job. This is beyond the scope of this paper, however. 
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5 Data and sample characteristics 
We use thesecond longitudinal version of the Linked-Employer-Employee (LIAB) data of the 
Institute of Employment Research in Nuremberg (IAB). This data setincludes the information 
described above to measure the effect of training signals on skilled entry wages after 
apprenticeship. Based on a firm identification number (ID), the data combine employer 
survey panel data with employee data from social security registration. The employer survey 
includes information on establishment size, sector, industrial relations, and employee 
structure. Employee data include information about daily wages, age, sex, nationality, 
schooling and professional education degree, and occupation (Jacobebbinghaus & Alda, 
2007). Based on an employee ID and the panel structure of the LIAB data, it is possible to 
observea worker’s professional career, starting with apprenticeship training. This implies 
that information about when, where and in which occupation the worker was trained, and 
whether he or she changed the employer or occupation afterwards, is available on a day to 
day basis. On average, more than 90% of the employees in each firm can be identified in the 
data. We use the waves from 2000-2002 of the LIAB as a quasi-pooled data set because 
every apprentice graduates only once and we therefore have exactly one observation per 
employee.11 
An important fact that has to be taken into account for the determination of entry 
wages of employer changers is the timing of the separation from the training firm. It is 
important tocontrol whether the separation happens immediately after graduation or some 
time afterwards. Harhoff & Kane (1997) and Bougheas & Georgellis (2004) show that direct 
movers have different wage expectations than movers with some tenure in the training firm 
after graduation. Additional occupational human capital obtained after apprenticeship 
training leads to an upward-bias of the estimates. As shown by Kambourov & Manovskii 
(2009), occupational skill specificity positively influences wages. Assuming that a graduate 
changes the employer after working for another year in the trained occupation with the 
training firm, one would overstate the signalling effect. The additional occupational human 
capital would artificially increase the wage effect of signals generated during training. A long 
                                                           
11
 In addition, the longitudinal LIAB data set entails establishments that responded to all employer surveys in 
the period 2000-2002 and therefore not many additional training establishments can be captured when 
additional years are added. 
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time span between graduation and the first skilled job could also be an indicator for 
unemployment, and thus for a loss of human capital, however. A long unemployment spell 
would negatively affect post-apprenticeship wages and bias the effect of credible signals 
downwards (Gibbons & Katz, 1991). As a consequence, we only use skilled employees with a 
maximal time span of 30 days between the end of apprenticeship training and the first 
skilled job. 
 
Variable All Stayer Mover 
Individual Characteristics    
Age 21.06 21.10 21.01 
Female 36.62% 34.36% 38.93% 
Grammar school 14.11% 18.30% 10.01% 
Western Germany 63.02% 78.56% 47.21% 
Occupation field
12
    
Commercial & Trade 36.01% 38.14% 33.85% 
Manufacturing 23.65% 29.16% 18.03% 
Crafts & Construction 32.18% 27.73% 36.72% 
Other 8.16% 4.98% 11.39% 
Training establishment 
sizeestablishment size 
   
≤249 23.20% 34.42% 44.09% 
250-999 30.88% 40.35% 37.34% 
≥1000 45.92% 25.23% 18.57% 
Number of observations 59,749 30,138 29,611 
Table 1: Descriptive sample statistics 
 
In addition, we restrict the employee sample to those who have finished an 
apprenticeship during the years 2000 and 2002, took training which lasted at least 24 
months, ended between January and September (the usual examination period) andare 
younger than 25 years old when they graduate. Also observations of apprentices with 
earnings above the upper earnings limit in the statutory pension fund (less than 140€ per 
day in western Germany and around 120€ a day in eastern Germany) and below the 
marginal part-time income threshold (a little less than 11€ per day) have been deleted.A 
descriptive overview about the number of training firms and apprentices is provided in 
Appendix Table A1. The number of observations is almost balanced across the three years 
and the total number of apprentices at the end of apprenticeship training is 59,749. In our 
data, around 79% of all apprenticeship graduates start their first full-time employment 
immediately after graduation.  
                                                           
12
 Based on Mohrenweiser & Zwick (2009), the occupation groups “commerce and trading”, “industry”, and 
“crafts and constructions” are shown separately. 
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Table 1 shows descriptive sample statistics on training firm and apprentice 
characteristics for the total number of observations as well as on subsamples foremployer 
movers and stayers. Table 1showsthat apprentices who are male, have the highest schooling 
degree (grammar school) and work in western Germany have a higher probability to stay in 
their training firm. The shares of stayers are higher in commercial and trade as well as 
manufacturing occupations and lower in crafts and construction occupations (this is also 
found by Mohrenweiser & Zwick, 2009). The share of stayers also increases with the size of 
the training firm.  
Table 2 shows substantial variation in apprenticeship wages at the 2-digit 
occupational level in the same firm and year (also compare Mohrenweiser et al., 2010). 
Wages at the end of apprenticeship training have an average standard deviation of roughly 
10% for all aggregations regarding either occupation or establishment size.This means that 
we have sufficient variation that can identify productivity differences of apprentices coming 
from the same training firm in a certain year and occupation. The LIAB data contain daily 
wages, calculated by dividing the recorded gross wage of a social security record by the 
duration of the spell. Therefore, the wage variable therefore includes performance based 
bonus pays. Almost 96% of all apprentices at the end of their apprenticeship training do not 
receive exactly the same wage as the other apprentices in the same firm, occupation and 
year at the end of their apprenticeship. The average apprenticeship wage variation increases 
with establishment size and is highest in commercial and trade occupations.  
 
Variable Mean wage last apprentice 
spell 
Average wage variation
13
 
Share of apprentices affected by 
wage variation at the end of training 
95.82%  
Occupation   
Commercial & Trade 31.48 € 4.09 € 
Manufacturing 29.49 € 3.52 € 
Crafts & Constructions 28.05 € 2.73 € 
Other 25.08 € 2.70 € 
Training establishment size   
≤249 25.21 € 2.17 € 
250-999 28.90 € 2.82 € 
≥1000 31.35 € 4.24 € 
Table 2: Apprenticeship wages and wage variation at the 2-digit occupational level in a firm/year cell 
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 Average wage variation means standard deviation in the same establishment, occupation and year at the end 
of apprenticeship training.  
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We rank the apprentices according to their wage position at the end of their 
apprenticeship training.14 We calculate a relative wage rank rikjt based on equation (5), where 
Rijkt is the wage rank of apprentice i in occupation k, in company j, at time t and Njkt is the 
number of ranks (or the number of apprentices) in occupation k, in company j at time t 
(Pfeifer & Schneck, 2012):15 
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Equation (5) only makes sense if we observe training firms with more than one apprentice in 
one occupation. The focus on training firms with more than one apprenticeship graduate per 
occupation per annum reduces the number of observations. Tables A2 and A3 show how the 
sample size develops for apprenticeship graduates and training firms when we only use 
establishments with more than one apprentice in each occupation/year cell and then reduce 
the observations to those employees who immediately work in full time after graduation, 
change their employer but do not change their occupation after graduation. About 20% of 
the apprenticeship graduates in our sample change their employer and about 80% of the 
employer changers stay in their training occupation16. 
According to our assumption that training firms should only retain the most capable 
apprentices, the stayers should – on average – have higher relative wage ranks than movers. 
We find no significant differences in relative wage ranks between movers and stayers when 
we compare all movers with all stayers. However, Table 3 shows the relative wage ranks for 
movers and stayers for firms with different training firm retention rates.17 There is a stable 
relative wage rank for stayers, whereas the relative wage rank of movers decreases with the 
retention rate. Except for retention rates below 40%, the differences between movers and 
stayers are significant at the 1% level. The findings in Table 3therefore are in accordance 
with our expectations: The higher the retention rate of the training firm, the higher the 
negative selection in the group of movers. 
 
                                                           
14
 Also compare the similar approach by Kroch & Sjoblom (1994) who rank employees by their education in 
their cohort. 
15
 Apprentices with the lowest wage have the lowest rank one. When two apprentices get the same wage, they 
share a rank. 
16
 Note that the descriptive statistics from Table 1 only marginally change after the new sample restrictions.  
17
 The retention rates are calculated by training firm per year. 
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Training firm retention rate Stayer Mover Difference 
<40% 0.507 0.499  0.008 
40% - 60% 0.510 0.486 0.024*** 
60% - 80% 0.507 0.473 0.034*** 
>80%  0.506 0.430 0.076*** 
Number of observations    
Table 3: Relative wage ranks of movers and stayers 
(*** p<0.01) 
 
In the next step, we perform a multivariate probit regression to verify whether the 
relative wage rank has a significant effect on the probability to leave the training firm: 
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We control for additional occupational,training firm and individual characteristics. According 
to adverse selection theory, we expect a negative effect of the relative wage rank in the last 
apprenticeship spell on the probability to leave the training firmwhen holding other factors 
for an employer change constant.The dependent variable in equation (6), yijt equals one if 
the apprenticeship graduate leaves the training firm after graduation (otherwise y=0) and rikjt 
is the relative wage rank calculated according to equation (5). Vector Oit includes the 
dummies for 2-digit occupations, vector Fit captures training firm characteristics such as 
establishment size, sector, presence of a works council, unionisation as well as the region. 
Vector Iit summarises individual characteristics such as age, educational background and sex. 
Vector T includes time dummies. According to negative selection of employer movers, we 
find a highly significant negative correlation between the relative wage rank and the 
probability of leaving the training firms, see Appendix Table A4. This means, the higher the 
relative wage rank of an apprentice at the end of apprenticeship training, the lower – on 
average – the probability of leaving the training firm. Marginal effects indicate thatan 
increase in the relative wage rank from 0.5 to 0.75 induces a decrease in the average 
probability of separating from the training firm – ceteris paribus – by approximately 2.35 
points. 
 
6 Signals of employer movers at the start of their skilled labour market career 
First, we verify whether our data produce similar wage differences between employer stayer 
and movers directly after apprenticeship training than previous empirical studies and test 
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whether the relative wage rank at the end of apprenticeship training has an effect on post-
apprenticeship wages. We conduct a simple entry wage regression including employer 
movers and stayers: 
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The variable lwageit is the log of the individual wage in the first skilled job. Vector Indit 
summarises the individual characteristics age, sex, region and schooling background. Vector 
Occit is the occupation on the 2-digit level, Firmit are training firm characteristics such as 
establishment size, retention rate, presence of a works council, collective wage agreement 
and sector, Rankit is the relative wage rank in the training firm and Mit is a dummy indicating 
a separation from the training firm.  
We find lower wages for employer movers of more than 4% that can be attributed to 
the negative selection of this employee group, see Appendix Table A5. This wage reduction is 
comparable to other relevant studies (von Wachter & Bender, 2006; Göggel & Zwick, 2009). 
We find a positive effect of the relative wage rank at the end of the apprenticeship period on 
post-apprenticeship wages.All other coefficients remain stable when the wage rank is added. 
If the relative wage rank increases – ceteris paribus – by 0.25, the average entry wage 
increases by 0.8%. Therefore, the relative wage rank at the end of the apprenticeship 
training seems to be a valid predictor for apprentice’s capabilities on the skilled labour 
market. Apprentices therefore can take the voluntary bonus from the end of apprenticeship 
to their new skilled job and employers are willing to offer higher skilled entry wages to those 
who already earned more during apprenticeship training. 
Now we analyse whether signals generated during apprenticeship training help to 
reduce the negative consequences of the adverse selection risk andaffect post-
apprenticeship wages of employer changers. We therefore restrict our sampletoemployer 
movers for the rest of the paper. The sample reduction allows us to get rid of unobserved 
heterogeneity between movers and stayers. Based on our analytical framework in section 2, 
a hiring firm determines wages based on information about the average human capital per 
occupation (αk), the probability of being of low ability (pkn) and the individual ability level (hi). 
As a proxy for hi, we use the relative wage rank in the training firm. 
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The most complex indicator to operationalise is the risk of drawing a lemon pkn, as we 
a priori cannot say which relevant indicators the hiring firm can observe. Therefore, we 
choose an exploratory approach and use several indicators for pkn. First, we use information 
about the average retention rates of apprentices in the occupation as well as in the training 
firm. We assume that training firm retention rates per year might not be as well known as 
the occupation retention rates.Training firms might not reveal it to the public when they are 
not able to take over their usual share of apprentices. In addition, enterprise take-over rates 
might be stronger affected by cyclical effects than occupation retention rates and therefore 
previous experience with employer changersmight be misleading. 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the apprenticeship graduates who change 
employer, come from an establishment with more than one apprenticeship graduate and 
obtain a skilled job within 30 days in their trained occupation analogously to Table 1. 
Equation (8) summarises our regression model for the entry wages of employer movers after 
their apprenticeship: 
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Here, lwageit is the log of the individual wage in the first skilled job. Vector Indit summarises 
the individual characteristics age, sex, region and schooling background, OccRateit is the 
occupational retention rate, Firmit are training firm characteristics such as establishment 
size, retention rate, presence of a works council, collective wage agreement, sector, and the 
average apprentice wage level given the occupation dafwlt, Rankit is the relative wage rank 
in the training firm at the end of apprenticeship training. Finally, Occit is a vector for training 
occupations at the 2-digit level, and Timeit are the three year dummies.  
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Variable Mean first full-time 
employment after graduation 
Wage in first job 68.61 € (S.D. 16.04) 
Unionisation 94.21% 
Works council 91.98% 
Age 21.07 (S.D. 1.59) 
Female 47.77% 
Grammar school 19.26% 
Occupation  
Commercial & Trade 53.09% 
Manufacturing 16.61% 
Crafts & Constructions 23.03% 
Other 7.28% 
Training establishment size  
<9 5.51% 
10-49 4.75% 
50-99 8.18% 
100-249 14.87% 
250-499 15.43% 
500-999 24.50% 
1000-4999 11.15% 
5000-7499 8.87% 
>7500 6.74% 
Number of observations 4,092 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on employer changers 
 
 Table 5 shows the regression output for five different model specifications. In Model 
1, we only include individual signals and indices which are not directly related to 
apprenticeship training quality. We find that the entry wages of females are lower. A 
grammar school degree and employment in Western Germany leads to significantly higher 
entry wages. Being older than the average apprenticeship graduate has no influence on 
wages – therefore the fact that some job applicants do not get an apprenticeship 
immediately after their school graduation or that they have to repeat a school grade 
obviously has no consequences for the entry wage of employer changers.These results 
remain remarkably stable when we add additional controls.  
In Model 2, we include the relative wage rank in the training firm. For the sample of 
employer changers, we find a positive albeit insignificant effect of the relative wage rank on 
wages in the first skilled job. It is quite improbable that the new employer knows the relative 
wage rank of job applicants during their apprenticeship period. This might reduce the value 
of the signal, for example in comparison to the final examination grades in the vocational 
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college and chambers of crafts and of industry and commerce that unfortunately are not 
included in our data set. 
 A higher occupational retention rate has a large and significantly negative effect on 
post-apprenticeship wages of firm changers (Model 3). The occupation retention rate 
therefore signals the strength of adverse selection of employer changers and employers 
adapt their entry wage offers accordingly. In Model 4, we substitute the occupational 
retention rate by information about the training firm. The average apprentice wage level of 
the training firm shows a significantly positive effect of high economic relevance. This means 
that the employment in a well paying training firm signals a high individual ability and a high 
training quality. The estimates on different levels of training firm retention rate show no 
effects. One reason for the lack of effects may be that the retention rates of training firms 
are not easy to observe for other employers. In contrast, training in larger firms leads to a 
wage bonus, probably because larger firms are associated with higher training quality and 
higher selectivity. Works councils are probably also seen as guarantors of a high quality in 
apprenticeship trainingand therefore have a positive wage impact – in contrast to unions 
and the training regulations in collective wage bargains. 
Model 5 presents the results for our full specification. Our findings support 
hypothesis 1: individual capability measured by grammar school increases post-
apprenticeship wages. Another predictor for post-apprenticeship wages for employer 
changers is the occupational retention rate and the adverse selection risk implied by it. 
Furthermore, the training reputation of the training firm, measured by the average 
apprenticeship wage, the presence of works councils18 and establishment size has a positive 
effect on wages in the first skilled job. Therefore, our findings support hypotheses 2 and 3 as 
well.  
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 The dummy for the presence of works council could also be seen as an additional dummy for establishment 
size,. However, the works council dummy remains positive and significant if we use a finer differentiation of the 
establishment size (<9, 10-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, 1000-4999, 5000-7500 and >7500) as well as 
the linear establishment size as explanatory variables. This suggests that the presence of a works council in the 
training firm has a genuine impact on training quality. 
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Log(Wage first skilled job) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Indices and Individual Signals      
Female -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age deviation from 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
occupational mean (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Grammar school 0.032** 0.031** 0.032** 0.032** 0.031** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Western Germany 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Relative apprenticeship wage   0.020   0.017 
Rank  (0.017)   (0.016) 
Training Employer Signals      
Average apprentice wage level♦    0.005*** 0.005*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Retention rate training firm (Ref.-Cat.: <40%) 
40% - 60%    -0.017 -0.017 
    (0.013) (0.013) 
60% - 80%    -0.014 -0.014 
    (0.018) (0.018) 
Works council    0.046** 0.046** 
    (0.023) (0.023) 
Collective wage bargaining    0.032 0.032 
    (0.024) (0.024) 
Training establishment size (Ref.-
Cat.: ≤249) 
     
250-999    0.014 0.015 
    (0.019) (0.018) 
≥1000    0.076*** 0.076*** 
    (0.020) (0.020) 
Occupation Signals      
Retention rate occupation (Ref.-Cat.: <40%) 
40% - 60%   -0.087*  -0.154*** 
   (0.051)  (0.056) 
>60%    -0.581***  -0.598*** 
   (0.045)  (0.044) 
Constant 3.821*** 3.816*** 3.909*** 3.825*** 3.974*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.047) (0.054) (0.048) 
14 sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
64 occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 46.05% 46.08% 46.05% 47.76% 47.78% 
Observations 4,035 4,035 4,035 4,035 4,035 
Table 5: Dependent variable: Log wage in the first job 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
♦ Wages measured as deviations from 2-digit occupational means 
All specifications with robust standard errors, standard errors clustered by training firms 
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7 Robustness Checks 
One shortcoming of the LIAB data set is that we do not know whether the employer change 
after the apprenticeship training is voluntary or not. An apprentice cannot easily signal 
whether he or she is a good choice just because he or she is a quitter instead of having been 
laid off. It is not allowed to explicitly mention in the employer reference at the end of the 
apprenticeship whether the apprentice received a take-over offer or not. Hence, it is not 
possible to distinguish between quits and lay-offs. This is a problem if unobservable 
characteristics of apprenticeship graduates who quit are different from those who are laid 
off and if thesame characteristics also drive entry wages as well as the value of the 
observable signals. One example could be that training enterprises choose less favourable 
formulations in their reference letter for those employees who do not get a retention offer 
(although they are legally bound not to use explicitly negative formulations).We do not 
observe the certificate but the formulation of the certificate is bound to correlate with the 
other individual and training enterprise signals. 
Gibbons and Katz (1991) derive evidence for the hypothesis that job loss from a plant 
closure does not provide a negative signal in contrast to a lay-off. Von Wachter & Bender 
(2006) accordingly show that the wage impact of apprentices changing the employer is over-
estimated if we cannot control whether the apprentice was laid-off or quit. They use the 
training firms’ internal variation in the retention rate of apprentices as an instrument for the 
employer changing dummy. Von Wachter and Bender accordingly measure the local average 
treatment effect (LATE) for a group of workers who moved because their training firms’ 
retention rate was lower than its average.19 
We implement this approach in our estimation strategy in order to test the 
robustness of our estimates in the previous section. As we focus on the group of employer 
movers, we do not have an employer changer dummy and therefore cannot apply an 
instrumental variable approach to take into account the endogeneity of the decision to leave 
                                                           
19
 Göggel & Zwick (2009) argue that a mass lay-off during the last half a year in the apprenticeship also can be 
used as an instrument for an employer change. This instrument indeed highly correlates with the likelihood of 
an involuntary employer change and arguably has no relationship to graduates’ innate abilities. They define a 
“mass lay-off as a reduction in employment in one establishment larger than 30 percent of the labour force 
within one year” (Göggel & Zwick, 2009, p. 15). Unfortunately only 160 observations are left in our sample even 
if we reduce the mass lay-off definition to a labour force-reduction of more than 20 percent. The results are 
therefore not very reliable and we do not display them here. 
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the training firm. Instead, we define a sub-sample of exogenous movers to measure the LATE 
of signals generated during apprenticeship training on skilled entry wages: 3,042 employer 
movers after their apprenticeship training left a training firm whose retention rate in the 
year of the separation was lower than its average retention rate during all three years. 
Table 6 shows the estimates for equation (8) on the basis of the new sub-sample.The 
coefficient for the average wage level of the training firm remains highly significant. The 
effects of the occupation retention rate are still significant and the training firm retention 
rate now also has a significantly negative coefficient. A large training firm implies a wage 
bonus in the first skilled job. Also a higher schooling grade still has a positive influence on 
entry wages. The results in Table 6 show that most of our central findings in Section 6 are 
robust to a reduction of the sample to apprentices for whom the probability that they had to 
change their employer involuntarily is high.  
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Log(Wage first job)  
Indices and Individual Signals  
Female -0.037*** 
 (0.009) 
Age deviation from -0.002 
occupational mean (0.003) 
Grammar school 0.035*** 
 (0.013) 
Western Germany 0.157*** 
 (0.020) 
Relative apprenticeship wage  0.003 
Rank (0.016) 
Training Employer Signals  
Average apprentice wage level♦ 0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
Retention rate training firm (Ref.-Cat.: <40%)  
40% - 60% -0.024* 
 (0.013) 
60% - 80% -0.023 
 (0.019) 
Works council 0.044 
 (0.030) 
Collective wage bargaining 0.009 
 (0.034) 
Training establishment size (Ref.-Cat.: ≤249)  
250-999 0.020 
 (0.019) 
≥1000 0.078*** 
 (0.020) 
Occupation Signals  
Retention rate occupation (Ref.-Cat.: <40%)  
40% - 60% -0.181*** 
 (0.062) 
>60%  -0.203** 
 (0.081) 
Constant 4.149*** 
 (0.061) 
14 sector dummies Yes 
2 year dummies Yes 
Occupation dummies Yes 
R-squared 47.22% 
Observations 3,042 
Table 6: Dependent variable: Log wage in the first job 
Sample employer movers from training firms with retention rate less than average 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
♦ Wages measured as deviations from 2-digit occupational means 
All specifications with robust standard errors, standard errors clustered by training firms 
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8 Discussion 
This paper shows that employer changers at the end of apprenticeship training are an 
adversely selected group and face an entry wage disadvantage in their first skilled job as a 
consequence. It also shows however that there are many occupational, employer and 
individual signals that have an impact on entry wages of employer changers. These signals 
are on the one hand consequences of institutional rules that imply credible institutions for 
certification of different abilities. In addition, the new employer usually has experience with 
employer changers in previous years or realistic ideas on the capabilities of apprenticeship 
graduates with different characteristics. The functioning of these signals may be an 
important reason why apprenticeship training still is an attractive venue for school leavers to 
obtain occupational skills although a considerable share of apprenticeship graduates has to 
leave the training enterprises and faces the consequences of being a member of a negatively 
selected group (Akerlof, 1970). It certainly also is important that potential employers of 
apprenticeship graduates can offer wages contingent on performance and usually first offer 
fixed-term contracts for skilled entrants to the labour market. This reduces the negative 
financial consequences of over-paying a bad draw from the group of available candidates or 
of being overly optimistic about the match quality between the candidate and the new job 
(Greenwald, 1986). 
Our focus group is large and it is the backbone of the German economy (Soskice, 
1994). The concentration on young employees without previous work experience and a fixed 
training programme with transparent and legally monitored minimum standards allows us to 
abstract from potentially unobservable third factors such as previous experience or tenure, 
cohort, continuing training efforts or business cycle effects. Differences between entry 
wages of employer movers therefore can mainly be attributed to observable occupation, 
training firm and individual characteristics. It is important to know whether apprenticeship 
graduates can signal their individual productivity because the attractiveness of investments 
in human capital crucially depends on the ability of the training participant to signal the 
quality of the newly acquired skills also to employers that did not train them (Foster & 
Rosenzweig, 1993; Acemoglu & Pischke, 2000). 
We propose to use the relative wage rank of an apprenticeship graduate in the 
training firm (given occupation and graduation year) as a measure for relative individual 
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productivity during apprenticeship. We argue that a high wage rank is the consequence of 
voluntary wage bonuses for apprentices. The wage bonus is paid for more able apprentices 
in order to give them a feed-back on their productive value to the training firm and increase 
the probability that the apprentices with wage bonuses stay after the end of their 
apprenticeship. Based on the relative wage rank we show that employer movers, compared 
to stayers, are indeed a negatively selected group from the training firms’ point of view. In 
accordance with prior literature, we find that there is an average wage penalty for employer 
changers that can be explained by adverse selection of the better informed training firms 
when they decide which apprenticeship graduate to retain.  
In addition, we assess the suitability of potential signals that reduce the information 
asymmetry between post-apprenticeship employer changers and hiring firms given training 
firms use adverse selection. We identify generally available indicators for a negative 
selection of groups of apprentices – occupational and training enterprise retention rate as 
the main drivers of entry wages. The higher the retention rate the higher is the risk that the 
employer changers are “lemons”. Accordingly, apprentices with occupations with 
(temporarily) high retention rates experience an entry wage disadvantage in comparison to 
employer changers in other occupations. The same applies for apprentices coming from 
training firms with high retention rates. Additional training quality signals such as training 
establishment size, relative apprentice wage level, and the presence of works councils in the 
training enterprise have the expected positive albeit less significant impact on skilled entry 
wages. Individual signals such as schooling background also have the expected impact on 
entry wages. Our signal for relative individual productivity in the training firm – the relative 
wage rank at the end of the apprenticeship training – is only valid in parsimonious 
specifications. This does not necessarily mean that apprentices cannot signal individual 
ability acquired during the apprenticeship training, however. Unfortunately, we do not 
observe the grades from chambers of commerce and trade, chambers of craft, and 
vocational college exams. Exam grades are a more direct and easier accessible signal for 
hiring firms than the wage position during apprenticeship training and they are most likely 
closely correlated with each other. We conclude that employer changers suffer from wage 
reductions when they belong to especially adversely selected groups, they can signal 
individual productivity and training quality however and accordingly reduce their wage 
disadvantage when they have a higher than average productivity. 
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In a robustness check, we take into account that our sample of employer changers 
consists of quitting and laid off apprenticeship graduates. We reduce the sample to those 
employer changers who with a high probability changed involuntary because their training 
firm had a lower than average retention rate in their graduation year. The signs of the signals 
remain intact in the smaller sample. 
The structure of the LIAB data allows us to control for training firm characteristics 
only. We therefore cannot include characteristics of the hiring firms and have to interpret 
the labour market value of the signals without taking into account differences between 
training and hiring firms.20 Another shortcoming of our analysis is the reduction of our 
sample to firms with more than one apprentice per year and 2-digit occupation for the 
construction of our individual productivity measure. The observable enterprise and 
employee characteristics however only marginally change after reducing the sample to firms 
with more than one apprentice.  
 Our focus on the entry wage of employer changers does not allow us to evaluate 
whether the separation from the training firm is efficient or not. Von Wachter & Bender 
(2006) show that the wage gap between movers and stayers vanishes within the first five 
years after graduation. This finding suggests that movers are not necessarily a negative 
selection for hiring firms – in this case, we would expect a permanent wage penalty for a 
negatively selected group. Instead, movers can be a negative selection from the training 
firms’ point of view but not for the hiring firm. In this case, separations improve the 
employer-employee match (Jovanovic, 1979; McLaughlin, 1991; Neal, 1999). To analyse 
whether movers are indeed a negative selection from the training firms’ point of view but 
not for the hiring firm, further research has to compare the wage developments during the 
first years in the new firm, with the wage development of stayers. If transitions are efficient, 
movers should have a steeper wage profile than stayers in the first years as skilled workers. 
  
  
                                                           
20
 Euwals & Winkelmann (2004) show for instance that the difference in size between training and hiring 
employer has a positive effect on post-apprenticeship wages of movers. 
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Appendix 
Year Number of training firms 
Number of apprentices at 
the end of training 
Number of apprenticeship 
graduates with full-time 
skilled employment 
2000 3,842 19,701 16,824 
2001 3,667 20,371 16,061 
2002 3,436 19,677 14,204 
Total 10,945 59,749 47,089 
Table A1: Data computation 
 
 
Number of training firms with 
more than 1 apprentice per 
occupation and year 
Number of apprentices in firms 
with more than one apprentice 
per occupation and year 
2000 1,507 11,483 
2001 1,492 11,919 
2002 1,323 10,426 
Total 4,322 33,828 
Table A2: Sample size for training firms with more than one apprentice in 2-digit occupation per year 
 
 
 
 
Number of graduates in a 
full-time position from an 
establishment with more 
than one graduate 
Number of apprentices in a 
full-time position who 
change employer 
Number of graduates in a 
full-time position who 
change employerand keep 
occupation 
2000 8,667 1,788 1,458 
2001 8,708 1,792 1,392 
2002 7,587 1,546 1,235 
Total 24,962 5,126 4,089 
Table A3: Data computation for graduates in first full-time job 
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y=pr(mover)=33.82% Marginal Fixed Effects Mean 
Relative wage rank -0.100*** 0.499 
 (0.011)  
Female -0.016** 33.90% 
 (0.007)  
Age deviation from -0.004** -0.109 
occupational mean (0.002)  
Grammar school -0.002 18.87% 
 (0.009)  
Western Germany -0.020*** 77.71% 
 (0.007)  
2establishment size dummies Yes  
2 dummies for industrial relations Yes  
14 sector dummies Yes  
64 occupation dummies Yes  
2 year dummies Yes  
Observations 32,822  
Table A4: Regression output for equation (6) 
Standard errors in parentheses. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05) 
Table A2 shows that we have 33,828 apprentices in firms with more than one apprentice at the end of 
apprenticeship training. We lose 1,006 observations by missing values in the firm data. 
 
ln(wage first_job) (1) (2) 
Employerchange -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Relative wage rank  0.032*** 
at the end of training  (0.005) 
Female -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Age deviation from 0.004*** 0.004*** 
occupational mean (0.001) (0.001) 
Grammar school 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Western Germany 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 3.608*** 3.584*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
2establishment size dummies Yes Yes 
64 occupation dummies Yes Yes 
Industrial relations Yes Yes 
14 sector dummies Yes Yes 
2 retention rate dummies Yes Yes 
2 year dummies Yes Yes 
R-squared 51.44% 51.50% 
Observations 26,263 26,263 
Table A5: Regression output for equation (7) 
Standard errors in parentheses. (*** p<0.01) 
Both specifications with robust standard errors 
 
